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THE EFFECT OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON THE 
LABOR MARKET:  REPORT ON ITALY 
Marco Biasi† 
I. INTRODUCTION:  THE DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
GLOBAL CRISIS IN ITALY 
As is well known, the recent economic crisis has had a severe impact 
on the Italian economy and labor market, as well as on the country’s 
political system.  In fact, with regard to the job market, it should be 
immediately noted that unemployment rates in Italy have increased 
dramatically since 2008, and the use of flexible contracts has become even 
more widespread.1  At the same time, the rigidity of permanent employment 
relationships and the discretionary power of the courts made dismissal cases 
uncertain for workers and companies, in addition to being very expensive 
for the latter.  Companies consider the protective norms a burden in view of 
their restructuring processes and as an incentive to use temporary 
employment contracts. 
Therefore, the Italian job market was characterized, at the same time, 
by a high level of “incoming flexibility”2 and a high level of “outgoing 
rigidity.”3  Accordingly, this situation generated a “dualism” between 
overprotection of the so-called insiders (permanent employees) and weak 
protection of the so-called outsiders (those hired with flexible and 
temporary contracts).4  Moreover, the productivity of labor did not reach 
satisfactory levels, which significantly affected the competitiveness of 
Italian firms in both global and national markets.5 
 
 † Phd in Law of Business and Commerce, Luigi Bocconi University of Milan. Post-doc in Labor 
Law, Department of Management, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.  
 1. In October 2013, the unemployment rate in Italy was around 12.5%, while it was around 6.1% 
in January 2007, and around 8.4% in January 2011.  See ISTAT, www.istat.it/lavoro (last visited Apr. 7, 
2014) (It.). 
 2. I.e., a widespread use of flexible forms of hiring. 
 3. I.e., a strong protection against dismissal. 
 4. PIETRO ICHINO, INCHIESTA SUL LAVORO:  PERCHÉ NON DOBBIAMO AVERE PAURA DI UNA 
GRANDE RIFORMA [INVESTIGATION ON WORK:  WHY WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID OF A GREAT REFORM] 
56–86 (2011) (It.). 
 5. In October 2013, according to recent data on labor productivity (i.e., gross domestic product 
per hour of work), Italy ranked thirteenth among E.U. countries with €32.1 GDP per hour of work below 
the European average of €32.2.  ISTAT, supra note 1. 
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In this context, the letter addressed by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to the Italian Government in August 2011 played the role of a 
“trigger event.”  This communication, whose contents were made public 
and were widely discussed in the national Press,6 provoked—or, at least, 
preceded—an “earthquake” in the national political framework, such as the 
early resignation of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Government, 
and the subsequent appointment of a “technical Government” led by Prime 
Minister Mario Monti.7 
However, the letter from the ECB also had a considerable impact on 
the internal debate about labor and industrial relations, pointing out some 
elements and strategies that, according to its authors—Jean-Claude Trichet 
and Mario Draghi8—could have a positive outcome and could improve the 
negative situation of the country.  Among others, these elements included 
the following: 
(1) Modernizing the industrial relations system; 
(2) Increasing flexibility and reducing the uncertainties relating to 
dismissal and redundancy procedures; 
(3) Boosting growth potential through new rules and tax 
incentives aimed at stimulating the efficiency of firms and the 
job market as a whole; 
(4) Reforming the collective bargaining system and empowering 
plant-level arrangements; and 
(5) Balancing “outgoing flexibility” with a more effective 
unemployment protection system aimed at providing the 
jobless with professional qualifications, job opportunities, and 
a new income support system. 
In line with these suggestions, in April 2012, the Monti Government 
presented the Italian Parliament with a Bill setting out Provisions 
Concerning Labor Market Reform in a Perspective of Growth.9  After a 
lengthy debate, the text was approved in June 2012, and it became Act in 
June 28, 2012.10  The new normative dispositions included substantial 
modifications mainly concerning labor law discipline and, to a certain 
 
 6. See Il testo della lettera della Bce al Governo italiano [The Text of the Letter from the ECB to 
the Italian Government], ITALIA & MONDO [IT. & WORLD], Sept. 29, 2011, www.ilsole24ore.com/ 
art/notizie/2011-09-29/testo-lettera-governo-italiano-091227.shtml?uuid=Aad8ZT8D (It.). 
 7. The letter is commonly deemed to have influenced the change of government in Italy, although 
this did not take place in August 2011, but only in November 2011, when Italy was facing severe default 
risks and had nonpolitically oriented government.  
 8. They are the former (Jean-Claude Trichet) and the current (Mario Draghi) Presidents of the 
European Central Bank. 
 9. Disegno di legge 18 aprile 2012, n. 3249 (It.). 
 10. Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 (It.).  Also known as Legge Fornero (Fornero Act), after Elsa 
Fornero, who was the Minister of Welfare in the Monti Government.  
BIASI 35-3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2014  12:55 PM 
2014] GLOBAL CRISIS AND LABOR MARKET IN ITALY 373 
extent, the industrial relations system that—as it is further discussed 
below—has undergone significant changes in the last few years. 
This Article concentrates on the main areas of intervention of the 
Legislator, as summed up in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Act, with the 
purpose of underlining the most significant changes and the potential 
outcomes of the new provisions, as well as the consistency of the latter with 
the aims of the Reform.  According to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Act 
92/2012, the Legislator’s fundamental goals were11: 
(1) To support stable employment relationships, underlining the 
role of the permanent employment contract as the dominant 
and most common form of hiring; 
(2) To increase the use of apprenticeships as the “prevalent form 
of access of young workers to the labor market”; 
(3) To balance worker protection, preventing abuses of “ingoing 
flexibility” and, at the same time, mitigating “outgoing 
rigidity” through a reform of dismissal rules; 
(4) To modify and renew the unemployment protection system; 
(5) To prevent the misuse of pension and tax incentives through 
existing contractual forms; 
(6) To promote gender equality in working relations; 
(7) To defend the occupation of senior workers (i.e., those over 
fifty years of age); and  
(8) To develop “worker participation” in line with E.U. principles. 
After the conclusion of the experience of the Monti Government—
which resigned in December 2012—the same path toward flexibility and 
adaptation to the “labor law crisis” was taken by the no longer “technical” 
but “coalition Government” led by Prime Minister Enrico Letta, who took 
office on April 28, 2013.12  The new Government had to face worsening of 
the economic crisis and finally approved “Letta Reform” in summer 2013, 
entailing slight modifications to the “Fornero Act” and tax and social 
security incentives for new recruitments.13 
II. A FOCUS ON “OUTGOING” FLEXIBILITY 
Leaving aside industrial relations, the main scope of the recent reforms 
may be found in the balance between an excessive “outgoing” rigidity and 
 
 11. Franco Carinci, Finalità, monitoraggio, oneri finanziari [Purpose, Monitoring, Financial 
Charges], in COMMENTARIO ALLA RIFORMA FORNERO [COMMENTARY TO FORNERO REFORM] 5 
(Franco Carinci & Michele Miscione eds., 2012) (It.) [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO REFORM].  
 12. The coalition supporting Prime Minister Letta was formed by both left-wing (PD) and right-
wing (PDL) parties.  
 13. In addition to a dramatic unemployment emergency (especially among young people).  See 
Decreto Legge 28 giugno 2013, n. 76 (It.), converted into Legge 9 agosto 2013, n. 99 (It.). 
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an excessive “ingoing” flexibility (or “flexibility at the margin”), which 
were both deemed to prevent employers from using permanent employment 
contracts. 
The Article starts by focusing on the theme that attracted most 
attention from both the mass media and law scholars – the reform of 
dismissal rules.  For a long time the topic was regarded as a “sacred cow” 
(or taboo), which the Legislator did not dare to touch.14  Starting with the 
last decade, it became the subject of intense debate and, more recently, with 
the above-mentioned letter by the ECB and the subsequent appointment of 
the Monti Government, the issue apparently became crucial, not only in a 
labor market perspective, but also as a fundamental area of intervention in 
order to overcome the country’s overall economic difficulties.15 
A. Historic Development 
The previous Italian dismissal rules were the result of four main 
statutory regulations.  While Article 2118 of the 1942 Civil Code granted 
the right of both parties to end the employment relationship with notice,16 
Article 1 of Act 604/1966 introduced the basic principle of “mandatory 
justification” in any case of termination of a permanent contract on the part 
of the employer.17  The above-mentioned justification required the presence 
of either a just cause or a justified reason to validly terminate the 
employment relationship.18 
In an event of unjustified dismissal, the remedy was a monetary 
compensation varying from 2.5 up to 6 months’ wages, or, alternatively, of 
the employer’s volition, the reengagement of the employee.19  According to 
the fundamental Article 18 of Act 300/1970—the so-called “Workers’ 
Statute”—in establishments exceeding the threshold of fifteen workers, the 
 
 14. The expression is taken from Otto Kahn-Freund, Trade Unions, Law and Society, 33 MOD. L. 
REV. 245 (1970), which was referring to the issue of union admission.  Bruno Caruso, Per un 
ragionevole, e apparentemente paradossale, compromesso sull’art. 18: riformarlo senza cambiarlo 
[For a Reasonable and Apparently Paradoxical Compromise on Article 18:  Reforming It Without 
Changing It], 2 C.S.D.L.E. 140 (2011) (It.).  
 15. In 2000, two political Parties (Radicali and Forza Italia) promoted a referendum with the aim 
to repeal Article 18 of  the Workers’ Statute, but the referendum did not reach the mandatory threshold. 
 16. According to Art. 2119 Codice civile [C.c] (It.), both dismissal and resignation may be given 
with immediate effect (without any notice period) in the case of just cause (i.e., “any cause that does not 
allow even a temporary prosecution of the employment relationship”). 
 17. The regime of resignation still falls under Arts. 2118 & 2119 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.).  
 18. See supra note 17.  According to Art. 3 Legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604 (It.), there are two 
different types of justified reason allowing employers to dismiss the employee with notice:  (1) a serious 
breach of contract by the employee (the so-called “subjective justified reason”); (2) reasons concerning 
the activity of production, work organization and the correct functioning of the latter (the so-called 
“objective justified reason”).   
 19. Art. 8 L. n. 604/1966 (It.).  
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compensatory remedy set out by Article 8 of Act 604/1966 was replaced by 
a reinstatement sanction.20 
Accordingly, any unfair dismissal occurring in establishments or 
businesses exceeding the mentioned thresholds gives the employee the right 
to be reinstated in his/her former workplace and to receive an indemnity (or 
back pay) corresponding to the monthly wages from the time of dismissal to 
reinstatement, with the deduction of the amount of money the worker may 
have earned from any other employer after the original dismissal (the so-
called “aliunde perceptum”).21  Moreover, the worker was permitted by law 
to replace his/her reinstatement right with a monetary indemnity of fifteen 
months wages—also known as the worker’s option—in addition to the 
previously mentioned back pay. 
Finally, Article 3 of Act 108/1990 stated that discriminatory 
dismissals—no matter what the size of the establishment or the business 
(i.e., regardless of any threshold)—fell under the discipline of Article 18 of 
Act 300/1970, ensuring the worker the right to be reinstated (or, in 
alternative, to exercise the worker’s option), plus the entire back pay.22  In 
addition to what has been explained so far about individual dismissals, the 
same remedy (reinstatement plus compensation) was granted in cases of 
breach of the rules concerning collective redundancies, in cases concerning 




B. The “Fornero Reform” on Dismissal 
The whole statutory dismissal discipline, based on the reinstatement 
sanction plus the back pay became, as anticipated, the subject of highly 
controversial discussions after the letter from the ECB.  In particular, the 
ideas at the basis of the new “Reform wave” were that the whole discipline 
was characterized by excessive rigidity, due to the presence of both the 
employee’s right to be reinstated and the right to receive monetary 
compensation whose amount could not be predetermined or foreseen, 
 
 20. According to Art. 1 L. n. 108/1990 (It.), Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute was applied also to 
businesses employing more than sixty workers. 
 21. I.e., any dismissals given without a just cause or a justified reason, or null and void for 
procedural or discriminatory reasons. 
 22. Under Art. 4 L. n. 604/1966 (It.), discriminatory dismissals were originally those motivated by 
political, religious, or union-related reasons; subsequently, Art. 13 L. n. 903/1977 (It.) included reasons 
related to race, language, or gender.  Art. 4 D.Lgs. n. 216/2003 (It.) added to the list of discriminatory 
reason those related to disability, age, sexual orientation, and personal beliefs.  
 23. See L. n. 223/1991 (It.). 
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because it depended entirely on the length of the hearing.24  The previous 
regulation was then criticized as leading to: 
(1) Serious limits to firm productivity; 
(2) Absence of foreign investments in national businesses; 
(3) Reluctance of national firms to hire with permanent 
employment contracts; 
(4) Widespread use of flexible forms of hiring; 
(5) A brake to firm growth above the fifteen-worker threshold 
(i.e., the “reinstatement threshold”); and 
(6) High unemployment rates. 
What is most interesting to point out—in a comparative perspective—
is that similar arguments were made in the past, (in times of economic 
hardship) in Germany, to promote changes to a rather protective dismissal 
discipline, despite the lack of any empirical evidence—either in Germany 
or Italy—of a correlation between higher rigidity of dismissal rules and 
higher unemployment rates/lower firm productivity.25 
Tackling a balance between “ingoing” and “outgoing” flexibility, the 
recent Act 92/2012 did not intervene on the conditions of dismissal fairness, 
but rather focused on the consequences—as well as the remedial system—
in cases of unfair dismissals occurring in establishments and businesses 
exceeding the same “old” thresholds.26  In fact, the reform of Article 18 of 
 
 24. Pietro Ichino, La riforma dei licenziamenti e i diritti fondamentali dei lavoratori [The Reform 
of Dismissal and Fundamental Rights of Workers], www.pietroichino.it/?p=21020 (last visited Apr. 7, 
2014) (It.).  In fact, the indemnity due to the worker according to Art. 18 L. n. 300/1970 (It.) covered the 
period between dismissal and reinstatement.  In case of upholding a worker’s claim on appeal (or even 
in the third stage of trial, before the Supreme Labor Court), the employer could be ordered to pay 
extremely high monetary damages and, with the exception of the worker’s option, even to reinstate a 
worker who was dismissed many years before.   
 25. Robert Rebhahn, Der Kündigungsschutz des Arbeitsnehmers in den Staaten der EU [The 
Dismissal Protection of the Worker in the E.U. States], 34 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [J. LAB.] 
163 (2003) (Ger.); Curt Wolfgang Hergenröder, Kündigung und Kündigungsschutz im Lichte der 
Verfassung [Notice and Protection in Dismissals], 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [J. LAB.] 358 
(2002) (Ger.).  On this point, Achim Seifert & Elke Funken-Hoetzel, Wrongful Dismissals in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 496 (2003), reporting accurately the 
historical process that conducted from a mere compensatory system (during the Weimar Republic) to the 
protection of the “social justification” of dismissals by means of a reinstatement remedy.  With reference 
to the Italian debate, see Franco Carinci, Complimenti, dottor Frankestein:  Il disegno di legge 
governativo in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro [Congratulations, Dr. Frankenstein:  The 
Government Bill Proposal on the Reform of the Labor Market], 6 LG 538 (2012); Adalberto Perulli & 
Valerio Speziale, L’articolo 8 della legge 14 settembre 2011, n. 148 e la “rivoluzione di agosto” del 
Diritto del lavoro [Artile 8 of the Act of 14 September 2011 n. 148 and the “Revolution of August” of 
the Labor Law], 139 WP C.S.D.L.E. 132 (2012) (It.); Valerio De Stefano, A Tale of Oversimplification 
and Deregulation:  The Mainstream Approach to Labour Market Segmentation and the Recent 
Responses to the Crisis in European Countries, 102 WP C.S.D.L.E. 30 (2013) (It.).  It may also be 
added that German firms and workers are currently considered as a “benchmark” of productivity, despite 
the fact that the German Legislator has not altered the traditional “rigid” dismissal protection scheme. 
 26. With the exception of a new pre-dismissal procedural stage, starting with the employer’s 
communication of the intention to dismiss an employee for an objective reason, followed by a meeting 
before an administrative body, with the main aim to encourage the parties to reach an agreement.  See 
Stefano Liebman & Elena Gramano, La nuova disciplina delle tutele in caso di licenziamento 
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Act 300/1970 by Act 92/2012 set up a new four-tier remedial system where 
the consequences of dismissal unfairness depend on the gravity of the 
violation of dismissal rules by the employer.27  In particular, according to 
the wording of the new version of Article 18 of Act 300/1970, the 
consequences arising from the dismissal unfairness may be the following: 
(1) “Full Reinstatement”:  in a case of discriminatory dismissal, 
dismissal affecting special categories of workers (due to 
maternity, paternity, marriage, etc.), dismissal determined by 
an “illicit reason,” or in the case of oral notice of dismissal, the 
employee, regardless of any threshold, is granted the right to 
be reinstated (or to exercise the worker’s option), plus back 
pay with the deduction of the aliunde perceptum. 
(2) “Weak Reinstatement”:  it involves cases of disciplinary 
dismissals (i.e., based on a just cause or on a subjective 
reason), when the contested fact did not occur or when, 
according to collective agreements, the contested fact should 
have been punished with milder disciplinary sanctions 
(suspension, fine, or reprimand).  Moreover, “Weak 
Reinstatement” is granted to the employee in cases of 
dismissal for an objective reason:  (a) when the alleged 
physical or mental inability of the worker was inconsistent; (b) 
in the eventuality of breach by the employer of the rules 
protecting employment stability in case of worker illness; (c) 
lastly when the fact at the basis of the objective dismissal is 
“clearly absent,” as well as in cases of erroneous selection of 
workers in collective redundancies.  In all those cases, the 
worker enjoys the right to be reinstated (or to exercise the 
worker’s option), plus the right to receive a monetary 
compensation capped at a maximum of twelve months’ wages, 
with the deduction of the aliunde perceptum and the so-called 
aliunde percipiendum, which is the amount of money the 
worker may have earned by actively seeking another 
occupation after dismissal. 
 
illegittimo:  il licenziamento per ragioni oggettive [The New Rules of Protection in the Event of Unfair 
Dismissal:  Dismissal for Objective Reasons], in IL NUOVO DIRITTO DEL MERCATO DEL LAVORO [THE 
NEW LAW OF THE LABOR MARKET] 351–63 (Mattia Persiani & Stefano Liebman eds., 2013) (It.) 
[hereinafter THE NEW LAW OF THE LABOR MARKET]. 
 27. Arturo Maresca, Il nuovo regime sanzionatorio del licenziamento illegittimo: le modifiche 
dell’art. 18 Statuto dei Lavoratori [The New Sanction Regime], I R.I.D.L. 447 (2012) (It.); Fabrizia 
Santini, Il licenziamento per giusta causa e giustificato motive soggettivo [The Dismissal for Just Cause 
and Justified Subjective Motive], in LA NUOVA RIFORMA DEL LAVORO [THE NEW REFORM OF WORK] 
238–39 (Mariella Magnani & Michele Tiraboschi eds., 2012) (It.). 
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(3) “Strong Monetary Compensation”:  in all residual cases of 
unfair dismissal (when inconsistency of the just cause, 
subjective, or objective reasons provided), the employee is 
entitled to receive only monetary compensation set between 
twelve and twenty months wages, to be quantified by the 
Judge according to the worker’s age and seniority. 
(4) “Weak Monetary Compensation”:  in cases of procedural or 
formal violations, the employee enjoys the right to monetary 
compensation between six to twelve months wages, to be 
determined by the Judge according to the gravity of the 
procedural violation and in consideration of the worker’s age, 
seniority, business dimension, behavior, and condition of the 
two parties.28 
In brief, it is clear that the choice of the Legislator to intervene on the 
consequences of unfair dismissals and not on the conditions of dismissal 
fairness was aimed at reducing outgoing flexibility and achieved by the 
reversal of the traditional role of reinstatement and back pay as general 
remedies in any case of unfair dismissal occurring in firms exceeding the 
previously mentioned thresholds.  The reform regime produced a shift from 
reinstatement to monetary compensation as general remedy in cases of 
unfair dismissal.  As pointed out by Pietro Ichino, there was a change of 
perspective from the previous “property rule” view—where the 
employment relationship was treated as a property right of the employee—
to the current “liability rule” view—where the employee’s right to work is 
protected by a compensatory system aimed at covering the worker’s 
monetary damages suffered due to the unjustified job loss.29 
In this sense, it has been observed that the employment relationship is 
still protected by the reinstatement sanction in cases involving violations of 
the fundamental rights of the employee (discrimination, violation of 
maternity/paternity protection, clear absence of the disciplinary or objective 
reasons), whilst in cases of “simple” unfairness, the protection of the 
employee’s interest may be effectively achieved by recovering monetary 
losses (more easily predictable by the employers).30 
 
 28. I.e., incomplete written motivation of the dismissal, absence of a preliminary formal charge or 
violation of an employee’s right to defense in case of disciplinary dismissal, violation of collective 
redundancy procedures.  
 29. Pietro Ichino, Nuova disciplina dei licenziamenti [New Discipline of Dismissal], 2012 DPL 
1545 (It.) (on property and liability rules).  On property and liability rules in general, see Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 30. Please note that the idea of establishing an all-encompassing predetermined indemnity with the 
different function of “severance cost” for any economic dismissal was entailed by Legge Proposta n. 
1481/2009 (It.) presented by Senator Pietro Ichino. On this point, see Franco Carinci, “Provaci ancora, 
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C. The Main Issues of the New Discipline 
A few words ought to be dedicated to the consistency of the 
summarized new norms with the principles and targets tackled by the 
Legislator.  As pointed out by many scholars, the new dismissal rules do not 
seem to solve the previous issues, in particular with regard to the uncertain 
outcome of dismissal cases before Courts and the related unpredictability of 
dismissal costs by the employers.  The rules also appear to generate the 
following new issues: 
(1) Legal uncertainty:  The presence of new tricky, or even 
obscure, statutory dispositions seems to increase, rather than 
reduce, uncertainties on the effects and consequences (and 
even costs) of dismissals due to the new judicial duty and 
power to choose between a four-tier remedial regime.31  New 
doubts arise because of the following uncertainties: 
(a) Dismissal for illicit reason and a discriminatory 
dismissal are uncommon concepts in previous Italian 
dismissal cases.32  In addition, there is the uncertain 
border between a sheer lack of justification and a 
discrimination hypothesis.33 
(b) The extension of judicial control in cases of 
disciplinary dismissals:  when is it possible to state 
that the contested fact did not occur?  I.e., is a fact a 
sole material action,34 or does it include a judicial 
evaluation of minimum severity?35  Moreover, is a low 
 
Sam”:  Ripartendo dall’art. 18 dello Statuto [“Play It Again, Sam”:  Back to art. 18 of the Statute], 138 
WP C.S.D.L.E 7 (2012) (It.).  
 31. CLAUDIO CONSOLO & DORA RIZZARDO, VERE E PRESUNTE NOVITÀ, SOSTANZIALI E 
PROCESSUALI, SUI LICENZIAMENTI INDIVIDUALI [TRUE AND ALLEGED, SUBSTATIVE, AND PROCEDURAL, 
NEWS ON INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS] 729–37 (2012) (It.). 
 32. Because the remedy in cases of both discriminatory and unjustified dismissal could previously 
be only reinstatement plus back pay (punitive damages could not, and still cannot, be admitted in 
discrimination cases in Italy), the dismissed worker had the tendency to contest the sole lack of 
justification of the dismissal (leaving on the employer’s side the burden of proof of the dismissal 
justification, in accordance with Art. 5 L. n. 604/1966 (It.)), thus avoiding to face the burden of proof of 
the discriminatory nature of the dismissal. 
 33. Maria Teresa Carinci, Il rapporto di lavoro al tempo della crisi: modelli europei e flexicurity 
“all’italiana” a confronto [The Employment Relationship at the Time of the Crisis:  European Models 
and “Italian” Flexicurity in Comparison], 4 DLRI 553 (2012) (It.). 
 34. Arturo Maresca, Il nuovo regime sanzionatorio del licenziamento illegittimo: le modifiche 
dell’art. 18 Statuto dei Lavoratori [The New Dismissal Regime: The Amendments to Art. 18 Statute of 
Workers], I RIDL 436 (2012) (It.); Mattia Persiani, Il fatto rilevante per la reintegrazione del lavoratore 
illegittimamente licenziato [The Relevant Fact for the Reinstatement of Unfairly Fired Workers], 1 ADL 
6–11 (2013) (It.); Marco Tremolada, Licenziamento disciplinare nell’art. 18 St. Lav. [Disciplinary 
Dismissal in Art. 18], in COMMENTARY TO REFORM, supra note 11, at 53, according to whom, not only 
the “fact” should have materially happened, but it should be necessarily proved to have been committed 
by the employee. 
 35. ANTONIO VALLEBONA, LA RIFORMA DEL LAVORO 2012 [THE LABOR REFORM 2012] 57 (2012) 
(It.). 
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working performance a mere—i.e., empirically 
verifiable—fact, or does it necessarily imply a judicial 
evaluation in order to assess that what the worker did 
or did not do could be qualified as a more or less 
serious breach of contractual duties?36  In criminal 
law, the main elements under scrutiny regard the 
material commission of the “fact” with which the 
defendant is charged (homicide, robbery, etc.).  In 
questions of contractual obligations and related 
liabilities the “fact” with which the employee is 
charged (delay, inadequate working performance, etc.) 
cannot possibly be a mere “fact.”  In order to reach a 
decision regarding liability of the employee, it requires 
an evaluation beyond its mere “existence.”37 
(c) The distinction between mere absence and clear 
absence of the fact at the basis of dismissal due to an 
objective reason.38  On the one hand, the clear absence 
could be a sign of a hidden discriminatory or illicit 
nature of the employer’s decision or illicit reason that 
is at the basis of the dismissal.  On the other hand, the 
hypotheses of clear absence could be those where the 
lack of justification appears, according to the Judge’s 
view and—above all—discretion, truly “evident” or 
“plain” (plausibly, on the basis of the sole evidence, 
 
 36. Franco Carinci, Ripensando il “nuovo” art. 18 dello Statuto dei lavoratori [Rethinking the 
“New” Art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute], 2 DRI 292–94 (2013) (It.); Oronzo Mazzotta, I molti nodi 
irrisolti del nuovo art. 18 St. Lav. [The Many Unresolved Issues of the New Art. 18], in IL NUOVO 
MERCATO DEL LAVORO:  DALLA RIFORMA FORNERO ALLA LEGGE DI STABILITÀ 2013, at 248 (Maurizio 
Cinelli, Giuseppe Ferraro & Oronzo Mazzotta eds., 2013) (It.); Adaberto Perulli, Fatto e valutazione 
giuridica del fatto nella nuova disciplina dell’art. 18 St.Lav. Ratio ed aporie dei concetti normativi 
[Legal Assessment of the New Discipline of Art. 18], ADL, 4-5, 792 (2012) (It.); Patrizia Tullini, 
Riforma della disciplina dei licenziamenti e nuovo modello giudiziale di controllo [Reform of the Rules 
Governing Layoffs and New Model of Judicial Control], I RIDL 159 (2013) (It.); Trib. Bologna 15-10-
2012, 4–5 ADL 907 (2012) (It.); Trib. Ancona 26-11-2012, BOLL. SPEC. ADAPT 21 (2013) (It.); Trib. 
Ravenna 18-3-2013, 6 LG 567 (2013) (It.).  
 37. This evaluation seems to embed a logical step from “conduct” to “misconduct,” or, in other 
terms, from mere “fact” to “breach of contract.” 
 38. Sergio Magrini, Quer pasticciaccio brutto (dell’art. 18) [That Awful Mess (Art. 18)], 3 ADL 
535–38 (2012) (It.); Luca Nogler, La nuova disciplina dei licenziamenti ingiustificati alla prova del 
diritto comparato [The New Discipline of Unfair Dismissal to the Test of Comparative Law], 4 DLRI 
685 (2012) (It.); Carla Ponterio, Il licenziamento per motivi economici [The Redundancy], 1 ADL 81 
(2013) (It.); Franco Scarpelli, Il licenziamento individuale per motivi economici [The Individual 
Dismissals for Economic Reasons], in GUIDA ALLA RIFORMA FORNERO, I QUADERNI DI WIKILABOUR 
[FORNERO GUIDE TO REFORM, THE NOTEBOOK OF WIKILABOR] 88 (Mario Fezzi & Franco Scarpelli 
eds., 2012) (It.).  
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documents, and circumstances presented by the 
parties).39 
(2) The discretionary power of the Courts:  The goal to reduce the 
space for judicial discretion on the consequences of unfair 
dismissals does not appear to have been achieved (at least not 
fully) by the new norms.  The already-mentioned unclearness 
of the text of the law and the introduction of new judicial 
prerogatives provided the Courts with even more extensive 
discretionary powers.40  For instance, the evaluation of the so-
called aliunde percipiendum gave Courts the power to 
determine whether it was possible for the worker to find a new 
job after the original dismissal, and which amount could be 
reasonably deduced from the back pay to the worker in case of 
“Weak Reinstatement.”41  Moreover, the new power of the 
Courts to fix the compensatory indemnity between twelve and 
twenty-four months wages does not allow the parties 
(especially not the employer) to predict the dismissal costs, 
considering the wide range. 
(3) The “degree” of flexibility:  Is the new remedy of “Strong 
Monetary Compensation”—an alternative to the previous 
mandatory reinstatement rule—more “flexible” from the 
employer’s point of view?  The maximum amount of the 
monetary compensation, which depends only in part on an 
employee’s seniority, may be deemed by employers and 
foreign investors to be a severe sanction or even a burden42 in 
 
 39. In this sense, the cases of “clear absence” of the “alleged objective reason” are limited to those 
where the documents allow the judge to immediately (i.e., without any further evidence investigation) 
ascertain the total lack of the reason adduced, like in the in hypothesis of dismissal motivated by the 
closing of a shop where a seller operated, in the eventuality that the shop was proved to be still open for 
business.  See Marco Biasi, Il nuovo articolo 18 dopo un anno di applicazione giurisprudenziale: un 
bilancio provvisorio [The New Art. 18, After a Year of Judicial Application:  A Provisional Review], 
181 WP C.S.D.L.E. 36–37 (2013) (It.); Trib. Reggio Calabria 3-6-2013 (It.). 
 40. Adriana Topo, Le regole in materia di giustificato motivo di licenziamento [The Rules on 
Dismissal for Objective Reasons], in COMMENTARY TO REFORM, supra note 11, at 68; Paolo Tosi, 
L’improbabile equilibrio tra rigidità “in entrata” e flessibilità “in uscita” nella legge n. 92/2012 di 
riforma del mercato del lavoro [The Unlikely Balance Between Rigidity in Flexibility and Outgoing in 
Law n. 92/2012 on the Reform of the Labor Market], 5 ADL 834 (2012) (It.); Pierluigi Rausei & Maria 
Tuttobene, Il nuovo quadro regolatorio tra incertezze e maggior potere ad libitum dei giudici [The New 
Regulatory Framework Between Uncertainty and Greater Power of Judges Ad Libitum], in LAVORO:  
UNA RIFORMA SBAGLIATA [LABOR:  A WRONG REFORM] 129 (Pierluigi Rausei & Michele Tiraboschi 
eds., 2012) (It.) [hereinafter LABOR:  A WRONG REFORM]; see Pasqualino Albi, Il licenziamento 
individuale per giustificato motivo oggettivo dopo la riforma Monti-Fornero [The Individual Dismissal 
for Just Cause After the Reform Monti-Fornero], 4 WP C.S.D.L.E. 160 (2012) (It.).  
 41. Carlo Cester, Licenziamenti:  la Metamorfosi della Tutela Reale [Layoffs:  The Metamorphosis 
of the Reinstatement Protection], in COMMENTARY TO REFORM, supra note 11, at 36. 
 42. Marco Marazza, L’art. 18, nuovo testo, dello Statuto dei lavoratori [The New Text of Art. 18 of 
the Workers’ Statute], 3 ADL 612–16 (2012) (It.). 
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the light of the lower caps to monetary compensation in other 
countries.43 
III. “INGOING” FLEXIBILITY AND THE PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT AS “DOMINANT” FORM OF HIRING 
As mentioned above, among the goals of Act 92/2012 a relevant 
position was ascribed to the support of the permanent and standard contract 
of employment, expressly labelled by the Legislator as the dominant form 
of hiring.
44
  Besides the reform of the dismissal discipline, the Legislator 
aimed at preventing the misuse of flexible forms of hiring, such as fixed-
term contracts and other employee-like contractual forms, including the so-
called project-based contract. 
A. The Support for Apprenticeship 
Flexible forms of hiring have spread uncontrollably over the last 
decade, becoming the prevalent form of access of young workers to the 
labor market.  The intention of the Legislator, the main channel of access to 
the labor market for young workers should be an apprenticeship,45 which 
was recently the subject of a statutory modification by means of a “Unified 
Code.”46 
On the one hand, employers have significant incentives to hire 
apprentices, such as lower salary costs and social contributions, in addition 
to tax deductions.  On the other hand, young workers have been given the 
chance to receive a qualifying training and, ultimately, be confirmed as 
permanent employees at the end of their training period.47  However, the 
reformed norms—aiming to the misuse of apprenticeships and promote a 
virtuous use of the same—combined factors of flexibility with elements of 
 
 43. For instance, the cap to monetary compensation in case of dismissal unfairness in Germany is 
normally up to twelve months’ wages.  MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY 132 (4th ed. 2008).  In Spain, thirty-three days of pay for each 
year of service with a cap of twenty-four months.  Jesús Cruz Villalón, Los cambios en materia de 
extinciones [Changes on Individual Labor Dismissal], 2012 INDIVIDUALES EN LA RIFORMA LABORAL [J. 
CRITICAL THEORY & PRACTICAL] 121–47 (Spain).  In Portugal, twenty days of pay for each year of 
service with a cap of twelve months.  De Stefano, supra note 25, at 12. 
 44. Art. 1 Legge 27 giugno 2012, n. 92 (It.). 
 45. Id. Art. 1, ¶ 1(b).  Apprenticeship was defined under Art. 1, ¶ 1(b) Decreto Legge 14 settembre 
2011, n. 167 (It.) (“Unified Code on Apprenticeship” as a “permanent employment contract aimed at the 
formation and occupation of young workers.”).  
 46. On D.L. n. 167/2011 (It.), see IL TESTO UNICO DELL’APPRENDISTATO E LE NUOVE REGOLE SUI 
TIROCINI [THE CONSOLIDATED APPRENTICESHIP AND THE NEW RULES ON TRAINING] (Michele 
Tiraboschi ed., 2011) (It.); Franco Carinci, E tu lavorerai come apprendista:  L’apprendistato da 
contratto “speciale” a contratto “quasi unico” [You Will Work As an Apprentice:  The Apprenticeship 
Contract From “Special” Contract To “Almost Unique” Contract], WP C.S.D.L.E. 145 (2012) (It.). 
 47. Laura Foglia, Sull’attuazione della componente formativa nel contratto di apprendistato 
[Implementation of the Training Component in the Contract of Apprenticeship], 12 MGL 894 (2012). 
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rigidity, thus raising doubts over the effectiveness of the Reform and its 
consistency with the declared targets. 
With regard to the new “rigidities,” the statutory modifications 
implied48: 
(1) A stricter numerical proportion between apprentices and 
skilled workers in service.49 
(2) The confirmation in service, after the training period, of the 
majority of previous apprentices as a condition for hiring new 
apprentices.50 
(3) A mandatory minimum duration of the apprenticeship 
relationship of at least six months.51 
(4) The exclusion of the possibility to hire fixed-time apprentices 
through agency work.52 
In summer 2013, the “Letta Reform,” while confirming the role of 
apprenticeship as the standard access of young workers to the labor 
market,53 provided for further tax and social security incentives to 
employers hiring—among others54—apprentices up to the age of twenty-
nine.55 
B. The New Role of the Fixed-Term Employment Contract 
If these rules do not seem to have a strong impact on the use of 
apprenticeships, a different evaluation ought to be expressed on the new 
regulation of fixed-term employment contracts.56  Besides a couple of new 
small rigidities—a limited increase in social security costs of fixed-term 
contracts and the initial expansion of the time-break between two 
 
 48. Art. 1, ¶¶ 16–19 L. n. 92/2012 (It.). 
 49. At most three apprentices for every two skilled workers; in companies hiring up to ten workers, 
one skilled worker for every apprentice; finally, in companies hiring up to three workers, three 
apprentices at most. 
 50. Despite the alleged nature of apprenticeship as a “permanent contract,” at the end of formation 
period the employer is entitled to dismiss the apprentice in accordance with Art. 2118 Codice civile 
[C.c.] (It.).  Therefore, the protection of the apprentice is limited to the notice period.  On this point, 
Giuseppe Maccarone, Il contratto di apprendistato nel testo unico [The Apprenticeship Contract in the 
Unified Code], 12 MGL 923–24 (2011) (It.). 
 51. The maximum duration of the formation period was already established by D.L. n. 167/2001 
(It.) for the so-called “professional apprenticeship” in six years. 
 52. Enrica Carminati & Michele Tiraboschi, Apprendistato: novità e conferme [Apprenticeship:  
News and Confirmation], in LABOR:  A WRONG REFORM, supra note 40, at 73.  
 53. Art. 2, ¶ 2 Decreto Legge 28 giugno 2013, n. 76 (It.). 
 54. More specifically, the tax and social security incentives provided by Art. 1 D.L. n. 76/2013 (It.) 
were applied both to the “standard” permanent employment contracts and to apprenticeship. 
 55. Lisa Rustico, La nuova disciplina dell’apprendistato [The New Discipline of Apprenticeship], 
in THE NEW LAW OF THE LABOR MARKET, supra note 25, at 141. 
 56. Franco Carinci, L’apprendistato [The Apprenticeship], in COMMENTARY TO REFORM, supra 
note 11, at 114. 
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consecutive fixed-term contracts, the so-called “stop and go”57—the 
Legislator allowed employers to hire an employee with a first, initial fixed-
term contract for up to twelve months, regardless of any legal requirements.  
The latter has been an extremely important change, because, according to 
Article 1 of Legislative Decree 368/2001, the basic rule is that any fixed-
term employment contract requires the presence of “technical, 
organizational, productive, or substitutive reasons” at the basis of the 
temporary hiring.  Although this “open clause” had the effect of increasing 
the role of labor courts in the evaluation of the “temporary reasons” 
adduced by the employer, the Italian Supreme Court and the ECJ stated that 
the use of fixed-term employment contracts has to be considered as an 
exception to permanent hiring, so that the fixed-term clause has to be 
justified by the presence of an objective reason for the temporary hiring.58 
Moreover, the above-mentioned idea was recently shared by the Italian 
Legislator, which confirmed the role of permanent employment contract as 
the dominant or most common hiring form.59  Accordingly, some scholars 
criticized the introduction of the initial unjustified fixed-term contract that, 
at worst, may allow employers to arrange a constant turnover of the 
workforce, replacing fixed-term workers every twelve months,60 or, at best, 
to use the twelve-month period of fixed-term hiring as a probation period.61  
In this perspective, the new normative solution may appear in contrast with 
the basic idea of promoting stable occupation and, above all, with the 
purpose of reducing “ingoing flexibility.”62 
 
 57. From ten days to sixty days in case of up to six-month duration of the fixed-term contract, and 
from twenty to ninety days in case of more than six-month duration of the fixed-term contract.  See Art. 
1, ¶ 9(g) L. n. 92/2012 (It.).  However, as already noted, the original terms were reestablished by D.L. n. 
76/2013 (It.), enacted by the Letta Government.  On this point, see Michele Miscione, I contratti di 
lavoro a termine 2013 [The Fixed-term Employment Contracts of 2013], 12 LG (2013) (It.).  
 58. Giuseppe Pera, Sulla nuova disciplina del contratto a termine e sul regime sanzionatorio del 
licenziamento ingiustificato [On the New Discipline of the Fixed-term Contract and the Sanctions 
Regime on Unjustified Dismissal], I RIDL 18 (2002) (It.).; Cass. 21 maggio 2008, n. 12985, RIDL 2008, 
II, 891 (It.); Cost. 14 luglio 2009, n. 214, RIDL 2009, II, 870 (It.); Case C-212/04, Adeneler and Others, 
2006 E.C.R. I-06057; Case C-378/07, Angelidaki and Others, 2009 E.C.R. I-03071; Case C-20/10, 
Vino, 2010 E.C.R. I-00148.  Although these decisions dealt with a repetitive use of fixed-term 
employment contracts and not with a single fixed-term contract. 
 59. Art. 1, ¶¶ 1(a) & 9(a) L. n. 92/2012 (It.). 
 60. Davide Costa & Michele Tiraboschi, La revisione del contratto a termine tra nuove rigidità e 
flessibilità incontrollate [The Revision of the Fixed-term Contract Between new Rigidity and 
Uncontrolled Flexibility], in LABOR:  A WRONG REFORM, supra note 40, at 58–59; Maria Teresa 
Carinci, Il rapporto di lavoro al tempo della crisi The Employment Relationship at the Time of the 
Crisis], RELAZIONE GIORNATE DI STUDIO AIDLASS [REPORT:  STUDY DAYS] 16 (2012) (It.). 
 61. Valerio Speziale, La riforma del contratto a termine nella legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 [The 
Reform of the Forward Contract in Law of June 28, 2012], 2 WP C.S.D.L.E. 153 (2012) (It.); Gaetano 
Zilio Grandi & Mauro Sferrazza, Il termine nel contratto di lavoro:  riflessioni a margine della Riforma 
Fornero [The Term Clause in the Employment Contract:  Reflections on the Sidelines of the 
Reformation Fornero], 3 ADL 562–68 (2013) (It.). 
 62. Luigi Menghini, Contratto a termine:  nuove regole [Fixed-term Contract:  New Rules], in 
COMMENTARY TO REFORM, supra note 11, at 93–94. 
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A. The “Project-Based Contract” and the New  
“Minimum Wage” Provision 
New rigidities seem to have a strong impact on self-employment and, 
in particular, on the project-based contracts, with the aim of limiting the 
misuses of this contractual form.63  In fact, special attention should be given 
to the new version of Article 63 of Legislative Decree 276/2003.
64
  This 
provision states that, despite the self-employment nature of the project-
based relationship, the payment due to the project-based worker should not 
be inferior to the minimum wage due to employees operating in the same 
industry branch and performing the same tasks, in the amount determined 
by collective agreements.  The new provision deals with two 
complementary aims: 
(1) It prevents employers from using project-based contracts in 
place of employment contracts with the sole aim of saving 
labor costs. 
(2) It grants project-based workers a minimum wage, or, as it was 
observed during the discussion on Act 92/2012 in Parliament, 
a basic income.”65 
With regard to the second argument—despite the normal reference to 
basic income to designate State assistance measures in favor of all citizens 
or special categories of needy people within a community—the new 
disposition seems to share similar goals.66  Considering that the guarantee 
of decent living conditions requires the availability of a minimum income in 
order to satisfy primary needs, the protection of project-based workers “ius 
 
 63. The project-based contract, regulated by Arts. 61–69 D.L. n. 276/2003 (It.) (the so-called 
“Biagi Act”), is a self-employment contract featuring a peculiar form of “coordinated, continuative and 
personal collaboration” between the principal and the independent contractor.  Therefore, according to 
Art. 61 D.L. n. 276/2003 (It.), this contractual relationship was based on a temporary project that ought 
to be determined in advance by the principal and then executed autonomously by the independent 
contractor “in view of a predetermined target.”  On this point, see Orsola Razzolini, La nuova disciplina 
del lavoro a progetto [The New Discipline of Project Work], in THE NEW LAW OF THE LABOR MARKET, 
supra note 25, at 195–222.  
 64. Art. 63 D.L. n. 276/2003, as modified by Art. 1, ¶ 23(c) L. n. 92/2012 (It.).  
 65. Giuseppe Bronzini, Basic Income, in I LESSICO GIUSLAVORISTICO [LABOR LAW] 49–60 
(Marcello Pedrazzoli ed., 2010) (It.). 
 66. Antonella Durante, Il reddito di cittadinanza: verso un nuovo modello di protezione sociale? 
[Basic Income: Toward a New Model of Social Protection?], II RGL 411 (2006) (It.).  Accordingly, on 
the idea of a stricto sensu “basic income,” see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
art. 34, ¶ 4, 2000 O.J. (C 364) (so-called “Nice Chart”, which states “in order to combat social exclusion 
and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure 
a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by 
Community law and national laws and practices”); Lorenzo Zoppoli, Reddito di cittadinanza, inclusione 
sociale e lavoro di qualità: profili giuridico-istituzionali [Basic Income, Social Inclusion, and Quality of 
Work:  Legal and Institutional Profiles], 1 DLM 76 (2007) (It.). 
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existentiae” is achieved by means of a mandatory minimum wage 
obligation on the principal/employer.67 
Moreover, the new provision seems particularly innovative in view of 
the lack of a minimum wage statute in Italy.68  Italian courts have 
traditionally referred to Article 36 of the Italian Constitution—which 
ensures all workers a proportionate and sufficient wage—as the legal basis 
for the extension of the minimum salary rates determined by collective 
agreements to all employees falling outside the coverage of the latter.69  The 
new provision appears particularly challenging because it addresses a self-
employment relationship, i.e., a space where the worker was traditionally 
deemed to have the same contractual power as the counterpart and to be 
free to determine the contents of a contract.70  Previous version of Article 
63 of Legislative Decree 276/2003 requires that the payment due to the 
project-based worker has to be proportionate to the quantity and quality of 
the work performed.71 
Nonetheless, any evaluation of payment proportionality had to be 
conducted by the Judge in accordance with the payment normally due for 
the same self-employment working performances and according to 
collective agreements, providing an adequate economic measurement of 
working performance.72  There was no statutory disposition granting the 
sufficiency of the payment to the project-based worker and worker’s right 
to lead a decent existence.73  On the contrary, with Act 92/2012, the 
 
 67. Paola Bozzao, Reddito minimo e welfare multilivello: percorsi normativi e giurisprudenziali 
[Minimum Income and Welfare Multilevel Regulatory and Jurisprudential Pathways], 4 DLRI 598 
(2011) (It.); Giuseppe Bronzini, Il reddito minimo garantito nell’Unione Europea: dalla Carta di Nizza 
alle politiche di attuazione [The Guaranteed Minimum Income in the European Union:  The Charter of 
Nice Implementation of Policies], 2 DLRI 230 (2011) (It.). 
 68. However, the lack of legislative provisions in the matter of “Minimum Wage” in Italy is 
entirely due to the will of the Legislator’s.  Pietro Ichino, La “giusta retribuzione” tra diritto ed 
economia [The “Fair Wage” Between Law and Economics], 2 DRI 171 (2002) (It.). 
 69. Traditionally, the Labor Courts related the term worker in Article 36 of the Italian Constitution 
only to employees and not to self-employed workers or independent contractors.  Cass.  1 settembre 
2004 n. 17564, Giust.Civ. 2005, I, 1257 (It.); Cass. 3 dicembre 2008, n. 28718, Giust.Civ. 2009, I, 304 
(It.); Cass. 23 marzo 2004, n. 5807, GCM 2004, 677 (It.); Cass. 25 ottobre 2003, n. 16059, Rep. 2003, 
3830, 4 (It.). 
 70. Art. 2225 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.) (In the matter of “standard” self-employment: only if the 
payments have not been determined by the parties, they have to be quantified by the Judge “in 
accordance with professional fees or customs, or in relation to the result effectively achieved and the 
quantity of work normally required to realize it.”). 
 71. NICOLA DI LEO, LAVORO A PROGETTO. INTERPRETAZIONE TELEOLOGICA DELLE NORME E 
RASSEGNA COMMENTATE DI GIURISPRUDENZA E PRASSI AMMINISTRATIVA [PROJECT-BASED CONTRACT: 
TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF NORMS AND COMMENTED REVIEW OF CASE LAW AND 
ADMINSITRATIVE PRACTICE] 147–49 (2008) (It.). 
 72. Art. 1, ¶ 772 L. n. 296/2006 (It.); Arturo Maresca, La determinazione del corrispettivo dovuto 
al collaboratore a progetto [The Determination of the Amount Due to the Employee in the Project-
Based Contract], in SUBORDINAZIONE E LAVORO A PROGETTO [SUBORDINATION AND PROJECT-BASED 
CONTRACT] at 99 (Giuseppe Santoro-Passarelli & Giuseppe Pellacani eds., 2009) (It.). 
 73. Giuseppe Pellacani, Lavoro a progetto e fonti collettive [Project-Based Contract and 
Collective Sources], in SUBORDINAZIONE E LAVORO A PROGETTO [SUBORDINATION AND PROJECT-
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Legislator recognized the modified conditions and bargaining power of self-
employed workers in the current job market.74  The Legislator, therefore, 
decided to grant self-employed workers a minimum wage protection.  In 
other terms, the statutory modification seems to produce a significant shift 
toward standard employment protection, resulting from the reference to 
collective agreements of standard employees as monetary parameter or as a 
mandatory benchmark for the determination of the sufficient wage due to 
project-based workers.75 
Accordingly, the new rules appear consistent with the purpose of 
limiting any use of project-based contract with the sole aim of labor cost 
savings, or, in other terms, in a “social dumping” perspective. 
IV. THE MOST RECENT TRENDS IN ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
A. Article 39 of the Italian Constitution and Its Partial Implementation 
With regard to industrial relations in Italy, the main and longstanding 
issue of interest is the partial implementation of Article 39 of the Italian 
Constitution.  This provision, which granted under paragraph 1 the basic 
principle of Freedom of Union Association, was aimed at drawing up a 
system of collective labor law, where the unions had to provide themselves 
with a democratic Statute and to enroll on a State register.76  Under these 
two conditions, the unions—acting by means of a sole bargaining unit with 
proportional representation of workers—could conclude collective 
agreements with general (erga omnes) effects and bind all workers and 
businesses operating in the related branch of the industry. 
However, due to the union opposition to excessive State control of 
both their activities and instruments (e.g., strikes) and toward any 
measurement of their own “numbers” or rates of consensus among workers, 
Italian industrial relations developed a pluralistic and adversarial system, 
different from the Constitutional scheme.77  According to the provisions of  
 
BASED WORK] 280 (Giuseppe Santoro-Passarelli & Giuseppe Pellacani, eds. 2009) (It.) [hereinafter 
SUBORDINATION AND PROJECT-BASED WORK]; Marcello Pedrazzoli, La disciplina delle collaborazioni 
ricondotte a progetto e dei contratti di lavoro a progetto, in SUBORDINATION AND PROJECT-BASED 
WORK, supra. 
 74. Adalberto Perulli, Riflessioni sul contratto di lavoro a progetto, in SUBORDINATION AND 
PROJECT-BASED WORK, supra note 73, at 132.  
 75. Marco Marazza, Il lavoro autonomo dopo la riforma del Governo Monti [Self-Employment 
After the Reform of the Monti Government], 5 ADL 875 (2012) (It.); Adalberto Perulli, Il lavoro 
autonomo e parasubordinato nella riforma Monti [Self-Employment and Employee-Like Relationships 
in Monti Reform], 4 LD 560 (2012) (It.); Vito Pinto, Prime chiose sulla nuova disciplina delle 
collaborazioni a progetto [Early Comment on the New Discipline of Project-Based Contract], 27 WP 
C.S.D.L.E. 151 (2012) (It.).  
 76. Art. 39, ¶¶ 2–4 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 77. In particular, the three main Unions:  the left-wing and most widespread among workers CGIL, 
the Catholic Union CISL, and the moderate Union UIL. 
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the Workers’ Statute, the condition for a union to establish worker 
representation bodies at plant level (the so-called RSA—and, therefore, to 
exercise union rights in the workplace—was initially devolved for both 
civil law instruments (agency or mandate) and sociological concepts such 
as representativeness (Rappresentatività).78  On the bargaining side, the 
capacity to conclude collective agreements depended on the dynamics of 
intergroup relations and on the union capacity to aggregate workers’ 
consensus and represent their interests.79 
B. The Dynamic Relationship Between Different Levels of Bargaining 
As a further consequence of the lack of full implementation of Article 
39 of the Italian Constitution, it was difficult to find a clear solution 
concerning the relationship between the different levels of collective 
bargaining.  According to the fundamental Cross-Industry Agreement of 
July 23, 1993, the system was based on the national-level bargaining, which 
had to guarantee common “minimum” standards of normative and 
economic protection.  Cross-Industry Agreements are also different from 
the plant-level agreements, which could discipline only those matters left 
“open” or unregulated at the national level with the purpose of integrating 
the “minimum” standards with company arrangements. 
Furthermore, the 1993 Cross-Industry Agreement replaced the RSA 
with a new representative body, named RSU, whose members—two 
thirds—were appointed by the workers on an electoral (universal) basis, 
whilst the remaining one third were appointed by the main National Union 
Confederations.80  However, this picture has been harshly challenged in the 
last decade.  Starting in 2001, the Italian Government’s White Paper 
endorsed new ideas of reform, dedicating the third Chapter to industrial 
relations, where the following three topics were addressed:  (1) the 
contractual system; (2) worker participation; (3) economic democracy.81  
With reference to point (1), it was stated that centralized collective 
bargaining creates obstacles to the growth of salaries by denying wage 
adjustments, and it increases the unemployment rate.  Therefore, it was 
 
 78. This happened at least until the 1995 referendum that repealed the requisite of the highest 
degree of “Representativeness” at national level as one of the two conditions to exercise union 
prerogatives at shop-floor level.  Therefore, the sole lasting requisite to appoint one member of RSA was 
the conclusion of the collective agreement applied in the plant.  See Pietro Ichino, Le rappresentanze 
sindacali in azienda dopo i referendum [The Trade Union Representatives at the Workplace After the 
Referendum], I RIDL 113 (1996) (It.). 
 79. Stefano Liebman, Il nodo della rappresentanza e della rappresentatività [The Crux of 
Representation and Representativeness], 1 DRI 40–46 (2003) (It.). 
 80. TIZIANO TREU, LABOUR LAW IN ITALY 141–209 (3d ed. 2011). 
 81. ROGER BLAINPAIN, THE QUALITY OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND CHANGING 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: IN MEMORIAM MARCO BIAGI, BULLETIN OF COMPARATIVE LABOR 
RELATIONS 44 (2002). 
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deemed necessary to turn the national-level collective agreements into a sort 
of “general framework entailing minimum wage determination and 
standards of protection,” and to strengthen plant-level collective bargaining, 
where the collective parties could reach company-oriented solutions. 
Moreover, the White Paper also encouraged a shift toward Worker 
Participation in management, and it was announced that a main target of the 
Italian Government was to give full implementation to the “elements of 
collaboration and participation endorsed at European level.”82  
C. The Effect of the Global Crisis on the Italian Industrial Relations 
System 
The above-mentioned proposals, however, became difficult to realize 
with the advent of the economic crisis, which had profound effects, not only 
on the Italian labor market, but also on the whole industrial relations 
system, bringing once again to general attention the long-lasting (or even 
chronic) issue of the lack of stable rules with regard to employee 
representation.  The dilemma related to the partial implementation of 
Article 39 of the Italian Constitution was perceived in times of economic 
growth, when consecutive collective agreements led to improvements in 
working conditions and better standards, so that no general issue of possible 
“derogation” or “hardship clause” could be raised. 
On the contrary, in times of severe crisis, when employers and their 
associations started insisting that bargaining could imply less favorable 
terms and conditions, the following three main topics became crucial: 
(1) The possibility and the limits for unions to conclude valid and 
binding collective agreements without the approval of all three 
main Union Confederations (CGIL, CISL, and UIL). 
(2) The effects of the collective agreements concluded without the 
consent of one or more of the other main union(s), in terms of 
exercise of union prerogatives at the workplace, in addition, the 
questionable extension of the standards set out in the “Separate 
Agreements” to workers represented by the opposing union or to 
nonunionized workers.83  
(3) The relationship between different levels of bargaining, 
considering the current trend toward decentralization in most 
industrialized countries.84 
 
 82. On the contrary, Financial Participation fell under point (c) of “Economic Democracy.” 
 83. I.e., concluded without the approval/consent of all three main Unions; the Union that did not 
take part into the negotiation nor gave its approval to the signed agreement. 
 84. DECENTRALIZING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATIVES (Roger Blanpain ed., 2007). 
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These issues were raised or, at least, amplified by the conclusion of the 
so-called “Separate Agreements” in 2009.85  They featured the opposition 
of the most widespread Italian Union (CGIL) and thus generated 
questions—answered differently by the Courts86—over the binding force of 
these agreements upon workers represented by the CGIL. 
D. The “Fiat Case” 
The above-mentioned issues were (and still are) at the basis of the 
highly disputed Fiat Case, which concerns the industrial relations strategy 
of the Italian-based Automotive Group “FIAT.”  As of June 2010, the 
company entered into an Agreement with only two of the major Unions 
(CISL and UIL), regarding the working conditions in the FIAT plant in 
Pomigliano d’Arco.87  Subsequently—after the conclusion of another 
“Separate” national-level agreement for the metalworking industry in 
September 2010 that entailed several clauses derogating the 2008 National-
level Collective Agreement (signed jointly with CGIL)88—the FIAT Group 
 
 85. See Cross-Industry Agreement by CISL, UIL, and Confindustria (the main Employers’ 
Association in the Italian Industry) of April 15, 2009 and following “Separate Agreement” for the 
metalworking Industry, concluded without the approval of CGIL on October 15, 2009.  Franco Carinci, 
Una dichiarazione di intenti: l’Accordo Quadro 22 gennaio 2009 sulla riforma degli assetti contrattuali 
[A Statement of Intents:  January 22, 2009 Framework Agreement on the Reform of Contractual 
Structure], 2 RIDL 179 (2009) (It.); Marco Esposito & Giuseppe Gentile, Costo del lavoro, 
competitività delle imprese e nuova struttura della contrattazione collettiva [Labor Costs, 
Competitiveness of Enterprises, and the New Structure of Collective Bargaining], 2 DLM 273 (2009) 
(It.); Riccardo Del Punta, Gli accordi “separati” sono antisindacali?  Il sistema sindacale “di fatto” 
nell’era della disunità sindacale [Are “Separate” Agreements Antiunion?  The “in Fact” Union System 
in an Era of Union Disagreement?], RIDL 690 (2011) (It.); Maurizio Ricci, L’accordo quadro e 
l’accordo interconfederale del 2009: contenuti, criticità e modelli di relazioni industriali [The 
Framework Agreement and the Cross-Industry Agreement of 2009: Content, Critical, and Industrial 
Relations Models] , 3 RIDL 352 (2009) (It.).  
 86. Stefano Liebman, Sistema sindacale “di fatto”, crisi dell’unità sindacale e rinnovi separati 
[Union System “In Fact,” the Crisis of Trade Union Unity and Separate Agreements], ADL, 2011, 6, 
484 (It.). 
 87. The Pomigliano Agreement of June 15, 2010 was approved by the workers of the Pomigliano 
plant with the ballot of June 22, 2010 (by a majority of 63.3%).  Roberto Pessi, La contrattazione in 
deroga: il caso Pomigliano [Bargaining in Derogation:  The Case of Pomigliano], 6 ADL 119–33 
(2010) (It.).  
 88. Also the September 29, 2010 Agreement was reached without the CGIL, and it was mainly an 
integration of the previous Separate Agreement of October 15, 2009.  See DA POMIGLIANO A 
MIRAFIORI: LA CRONACA SI FA STORIA [FROM POMIGLIANO MIRAFIORI: A CHRONICLED HISTORY] 
(Franco Carinci ed., 2011) (It.).  On the so-called “Fiat case” see Iacopo Senatori, Multinationals and 
National Industrial Relations in Times of Crisis:  The Case of FIAT, 28 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. 
REL. 169 (2012); Il caso “Fiat” una crisi di sistema [The Case “Fiat”—A Crisis of System], 2 LD 
(2011) (It.); Bruno Caruso, La rappresentazione negoziale irrisolta – il caso “Fiat” tra teoria, 
ideologia, tecnica e . . . cronaca [The Representation of Unresolved Negotiation – the Case of “Fiat”:  
Theory, Ideology, Technology. . . Record], II RIDL 265 (2011) (It.).  Mainly, in the matter of working 
hours and limits to the right to strike.  Pasquale Chieco, Accordi Fiat, clausola di pace sindacale e limiti 
al diritto di sciopero [Fiat Agreements, Union, and Peace Clause Limits the Right to Strike], WP 
C.S.D.L.E. 117 (2012) (It.); Luisa Corazza, Tregua sindacale, governo del conflitto collettivo e 
competitività internazionale [Industrial Peace, the Government of Collective Conflict, and International 
Competitiveness], RIDL 617 (2011) (It.).  
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entered into two additional “Separate” Agreements, in December 2010 and 
February 2011.89 
Furthermore, the first of the latter agreements was labelled by the 
contracting parties as a “National-level Collective Agreement,” despite the 
fact that the agreement was related only to FIAT workers, and that it was 
concluded without the presence of Italy’s largest and most widespread 
union (CGIL) and the main employers’ association (Confindustria).  In this 
sense, one of the hallmarks of the “FIAT Case” in Italy was the attempt by 
the company to develop an independent—or alternative—contractual 
system and to apply similar contractual regulations throughout the whole, 
expanding the FIAT Group.90 
In relation to this strategy, it is possible to explain the decision by 
FIAT, on the one hand, to quit “Confindustria,” and, at the same time, to 
establish a new company (“NewCo”) in view of the application to the 
whole workforce of the sole collective agreements concluded for the FIAT 
Group.91  Moreover, as a consequence of the conclusion of “FIAT 
Agreements” without CGIL, the union, strongly opposing FIAT’s strategy, 
was not entitled to exercise union prerogatives in the workplace, because 
Article 19 of Act 300/1970 granted the presence of union representatives 
(RSA) and the exercise of union rights only to unions that “have concluded 
the agreement that is applied in the plant.”92 
 
 89. The two Agreements are dated December 29, 2010 and February 17, 2011.  Another separate 
“National Level Collective Agreement” was signed on December 23, 2010 (without CGIL and 
Confindustria) in relation to working conditions in the Mirafiori Plant.  The latter Agreement was 
approved on January 13–14, 2011 by workers with a ballot (54% majority).  Raffaele De Luca Tamajo, I 
quattro accordi collettivi del Gruppo Fiat:  una prima ricognizione [The Four Collective Agreements of 
the Fiat Group:  A Preliminary Survey], III RIDL 113 (2011) (It.); Giuseppe Santoro Passarelli, I 
contratti collettivi della Fiat di Mirafiori e Pomigliano [Collective Agreements of Fiat in Mirafiori and 
Pomigliano], III RIDL 161 (2011) (It.). 
 90. In fact, as it is known, this shift in the industrial relations Strategy in FIAT coincided with the 
takeover of the U.S. Automotive Company Chrysler by FIAT.  On the relationship between the 
International Strategy of FIAT Group and its industrial relations System, Edoardo Ales, Dal “caso 
FIAT” al “caso Italia”. Il diritto del lavoro “di prossimità”, le sue scaturigini e i suoi limiti 
costituzionali [From “FIAT” to the “Italian Case”:  The Proximity Labor Law, Its Issues and Its 
Constitutional Limits], WP C.S.D.L.E. 134 (2011) (It.); Giuseppe Berta, I nuovi criteri dell’azione 
sindacale secondo la UAW [The New Criteria of Union Activity in Accordance with the UAW], 1 DLRI 
95 (2011) (It.); Adalberto Perulli, Delocalizzazione produttiva e relazioni industriali nella 
globalizzazione. Note a margine del caso FIAT [Relocation of Production and Industrial Relations in 
Globalization:  Notes on the Sidelines of the FIAT Event], 2 LD 343 (2011) (It.); Silvana Sciarra, Uno 
sguardo oltre la Fiat – Aspetti nazionali e transnazionali nella contrattazione collettiva della crisi [A 
Look Beyond the FIAT:  National and Transnational Aspects of the Collective Bargaining of Crisis], III 
RIDL 169 (2011) (It.). 
 91. Riccardo Del Punta, Note su Pomigliano [Notes on Pomigliano], 2 DLM 505 (2010) (It.); 
Giuseppe Ferraro, Le relazioni industriali dopo “Mirafiori” [Industrial Relations After “Mirafiori”], 
RDSS 119 (2011) (It.). 
 92. Enrico Gragnoli, Il sindacato in azienda, la titolarità dei diritti sindacali e la crisi del modello 
dell’art. 19 St. Lav. [The Trade Union at the Workplace, the Legitimacy to Exercise Trade Union Rights 
and the Crisis of Art. 19], 3 ADL 609–11 (2012) (It.). 
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However, the case recently came to the attention of the Constitutional 
Court, which observed that Article 19 was in contrast with Article 39 of the 
Italian Constitution in the matter of freedom of union association and 
effectiveness of union activity.
93
  Accordingly, the Court stated that Article 
19 Act should grant the right to establish workplace representatives not only 
to unions who concluded the agreement that is applied by the company, but 
also to those unions that had taken an active part in the negotiations but that 
did not of their own free will approve the final text.94 
E. A Revised “Unity” Between the Unions and the Subsequent State 
Intervention 
During the course of these events and the multiple controversies 
pending in many Italian Labor Tribunals (upon application by CGIL95), the 
social parties (i.e., all three main unions, plus the Employers’ Association 
“Confindustria”) reached a “compromise.”  On June 28, 2011, Cross-
Industry Agreement set new rules with regard to union representation and to 
the relationship between different levels of bargaining.96  The Agreement 
aimed to create “a regulated industrial relations system, in order to 
enhance,” not only “legal certainty in matter of representation bodies, 
levels, timing, and purposes of collective bargaining,” but also “future 
compliance of the contracting parties with the new [and] shared rules.”97  
With regard to the first aspect, the Cross-Industry Agreement stated that: 
Representativeness required to negotiate a national-level collective 
agreement was recognized to Unions reaching a minimum threshold of 
5% of worker representation, to be quantified in terms of average 
between the percentage of total union fees collected and the preferences 
 
 93. Art. 19 Legge 20 maggio 1970, n. 300 (It.) (in its post-1995 version).  
 94. Cost. 23 luglio 2013, n. 231 (It.); Franco Carinci, Il buio oltre la siepe. Corte Costituzionale 23 
luglio 2013, n. 231 [The Darkness Beyord the Hedge:  Consttutional Court Decision of July 23, 2013, n. 
231], 4 DRI 899 (2013) (It.); Gaetano Zilio Grandi, A volte ritornano:  l’art. 39, cc. 2-4, Cost. dopo gli 
accordi interconfederali e la sentenza della Corte costituzionale sull’art. 19 Bollettino Adapt 
[Sometimes They Come Back:  The Art. 39 of the Constitution After the Inter-Confederation Agreements 
and the Judgement of the Constitutional Court on Art. 19] (July 8, 2013) (It.), 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/22452grandi_2013_26.pdf. 
 95. Veronica Papa, L’art. 19 Stat. nell’affaire Fiat tra dissensi giurisprudenziali e sospetti di 
incostituzionalità [Art. 19 in the Affair Fiat Between Jurisprudential Disagreements and Suspicion of 
Unconstitutionality], WP C.S.D.L.E. 147 (2012) (It.). 
 96. For details of the Cross-Industry Agreement of June 28, 2011, see Franco Carinci, L’accordo 
Interconfederale del 28 giugno 2011:  Armistizio o pace? [The Cross-Industry Agreement of June 28, 
2011:  Armistice or Peace], WP C.S.D.L.E. 125 (2011) (It.); Giovanni Orlandini, L’accordo 
interconfederale del 28 giugno 2011:  molti dubbi e poche certezze [The Cross-Industry Agreement of 
June 28, 2011:  Many Doubts and Few Certainties], www.dirittisocialiecittadinanza.org (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2014); Ricerche:  Le relazioni industriali dopo l’accordo del 28 giugno 2011 [Researches:  
Industrial Relations After the Agreement of June 28, 2011], 3 DRI 613 (2011) (It.).  However, it should 
be noted that any Cross-Industry Agreement is binding for contracting parties and not for third parties. 
 97. Cross-Industry Agreement, Preamble (June 28, 2011).  
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accorded in the periodic elections of worker representatives at shop-
floor level.98 
With regard to the relationship between different levels of bargaining, 
the Parties agreed on “controlled decentralization,” declaring that “the 
national-level collective agreement has the function to give certain rules 
upon the economic and normative regulation of working relations for the 
whole sector and country,” whereas “plant-level agreements regulate 
matters that are delegated, totally or in part, by the national-level 
agreement.”99  Moreover, the Parties affirmed that “plant-level collective 
agreements may also, “within the limits and under the conditions set out by 
national-level Collective Agreements” and with eventual effects upon the 
whole workforce, entail “provisions that modify or reduce the protections 
granted to workers by national-level agreements.”100  Finally, the Parties 
encouraged the Legislator to “adopt measures, in terms of tax and social 
security deductions, to promote plant-level collective bargaining,” in order 
to “link wages to productivity targets and to the firm’s results.”101  Right 
after the mentioned “suggestion” of the Social Parties, the Legislator 
introduced a new discipline on the effects of plant-level collective 
agreements.102 
In fact, not only the new statutory dispositions provided 
“Decentralized Agreements” with potential erga omnes effects, but the 
Legislator also stated that the “Decentralized Agreements” may derogate, 
without any limitation, the provisions of National-Level Collective 
 
 98. Id. Point 1. 
 99. Id. Points 2 & 3; Mattia Persiani, Osservazioni estemporanee sull’accordo interconfederale del 
2011 [Extemporaneous Remarks on the Cross-Industry Agreement of 2011], 3 ADL 451 (2011) (It.); 
Tiziano Treu, L’accordo 28 giugno 2011 e oltre [The Agreement of June 28, 2011 and Beyond], 3 DRI 
RICERCHE 617 (2011) (It.). 
 100. The conditions for erga omnes effects according to June 28, 2011 Agreement refer to the 
majority of votes, under the conditions listed in Point 4 for RSU and Point 5 for RSA.  However, it has 
to be borne in mind that the Cross-Industry Agreement has binding effects only upon the contracting 
Parties (workers and employers represented by the contracting Parties and these latter).  Moreover, as 
stated in Point 7 of the Agreement, with regard to the effect of the latter dispositions upon individual 
workers, the Social Parties established that the effect of any “Peace Obligation Clause” could not be 
extended to individual workers, considering the—individual, though collectively exercised—“Right to 
Strike” protected by Art. 40 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).  On this point, with reference to the different 
regulation brought in by the “Pomigliano Agreement,” see Franco Liso, Appunti su alcuni profili 
giuridici delle recenti vicende FIAT [Notes on Certain Legal Aspects of Recent Events in FIAT], 2 DLRI 
130 (2011) (It.); Raffaele De Luca Tamajo, Accordo di Pomigliano e criticità del sistema di relazioni 
industriali italiane [Pomigliano Agreement and Issues of the Italian System of Industrial Relations], III 
RIDL 797 (2010) (It.).  See also Cross-Industry Collective Agreement, Point 7 (June 28, 2011) (It.).  
However, the contracting Parties stated that any less protective working conditions agreed at plant level, 
on the one hand, “should be introduced during company downturns or in presence of significant 
investment plans” and, on the other hand, it “should regard [only] working performance, working hours 
and organization of work.”  Id. 
 101. More properly, the Social Parties recognized the necessity that the Government promoted 
plant-level collective bargaining.  See Cross-Industry Agreement, Point 8 (June 28, 2011) (It.). 
 102. Art. 8 Legge 14 settembre 2011, n. 148 (It.) (“Summer 2011 Financial Act”); Art. 8 Decreto 
Legge 13 agosto 2011, n. 138 (It.) (converted into Legge 14 settembre 2011, n. 148 (It.)). 
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Agreements as well as any normative disposition, with the only limit of the 
mandatory respect of Constitutional and European norms (plus those 
included in International Labor Charters).103 
The provisions were immediately criticized by scholars, who 
highlighted the unprecedented supremacy of Plant-Level Agreement not 
only with regard to national-level agreements, but even to the Law itself.104  
Moreover, the provisions were strictly opposed by the Social Parties, who, 
with a joint declaration of September 21, 2011, explicitly asserted that “the 
regulation in matter of industrial relations and collective bargaining has to 
be left to the autonomous determination by Social Parties.”105 
Therefore, the Parties declared that they “bind themselves to abide by 
the regulation by the Cross-Industry Agreement of June 28, 2011, applying 
entirely the content of the latter and ensuring that all Shop-floor 
representatives abide by the same rules.”  Furthermore, in accordance with 
the Cross-Industry Agreement of June 28, 2011, the parties came to the 
approval of the Cross-Industry Agreement of May 5, 2013, with the aim of 
reinforcing the majority principle and the effectiveness of collective 
bargaining.106  The parties stated the right of any union exceeding the 5% 
 
 103. According to L. n. 148/2011, the expression “Decentralized Agreements” designates not only 
plant-level collective agreements, but also agreements concluded at regional level by “unions with most 
representativeness at national or regional Level or their plant-level representatives, in accordance with 
the Cross-Industry Agreement [of June 28, 2011],” although only in cases of “approval by the majority 
of workers’ representatives.”  Art. 8, ¶ 2 L. n. 148/2011 (It.). 
 104. CONTRATTAZIONE IN DEROGA. ACCORDO INTERCONFEDERALE DEL 28 GIUGNO 2011 E ART. 8 
DEL D.L. N. 138/2011 [BARGAINING IN DEROGATION:  CROSS-INDUSTRY AGREEMENT AND ART. 8 OF 
JUNE 28, 2011 DECREE] (Franco Carinci ed., 2012) (It.); AA.VV., Il tema:  Contrattazione di prossimità 
e art. 8, L. n. 148/2011 [The Theme:  Proximity Bargaining and Art. 8, Act no. 148/2011], 3 RGL 453–
60 (2012) (It.); Francesco Liso, Osservazioni sull’accordo interconfederale del 28 giugno 2011 e sulla 
legge in materia di “contrattazione collettiva di prossimità” [Observations on Agreement of June 28, 
2011 and on the Act Regarding Collective Bargaining Proximity], WP C.S.D.L.E. 157 (2012); Franco 
Liso, Brevi note sull’accordo interconfederale del 28 giugno 2011 e sull’articolo 8 della legge n. 
148/2011 [Brief Notes on the Cross-Industry Agreement of June 28, 2011 and Art. 8 of Act no. 
148/2011], 3 DLRI 453 (2012) (It.); Mario Napoli, Osservazioni sul sostegno legislativo alla 
contrattazione aziendale [Observations on the Legislative Support to Enterprise Bargaining], 3 DLRI 
467 (2012) (It.); Adelberto Perulli & Valerio Speziale, L’articolo 8 della legge 14 settembre 2011, n. 
148 e la “rivoluzione di Agosto” del Diritto del lavoro [Art. 8 of the Act of Sept. 14, 2011, n. 148 and 
the “Revolution of August” of the Labor Law], WP C.S.D.L.E. 132 (2011) (It.); Franco Scarpelli, 
Rappresentatività e contrattazione tra l’accordo unitario di giugno e le discutibili ingerenze del 
legislatore [Representation and Bargaining Between the Unity Agreement of June and the Questionable 
Interference of the Legislator], WP C.S.D.L.E. 127 (2011) (It.). 
 105. I.e., shared by CGIL, CISL, UIL, and Confindustria. 
 106. On Cross-Industry Agreement of May 31, 2011 (It.), see AA.VV., Accordo sulla 
rappresentanza e rappresentatività del 31 maggio 2013 tra Confindustria e sindacati [Agreement on 
Representation and Representativeness of May 31, 2013 Between Confindustria and the Unions], 3 DRI 
598 (2013) (It.); Valerio De Stefano & Stefano Liebman, Le clausole che regolano la trattativa 
sindacale nel protocollo d’intesa del 31 maggio 2013: l’occasione per una ricostruzione diacronica 
[The Clauses Governing the Union Negotiations in the Agreement of May 31, 2013:  The Opportunity 
for a Diachronic Reconstruction], 5 ADL 737 (2013) (It.); Michele De Luca, Rappresentatività 
sindacale nel protocollo d’intesa del 31 maggio 2013 ed in recente pronuncia di incostituzionalità 
(dell’articolo 19 dello statuto dei lavoratori):  dall’ordinamento intersindacale alla rilevanza per 
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threshold to take part in the negotiation of National-Level Collective 
Agreements and the erga omnes effects of any agreement concluded by 
unions exceeding together 50% of the overall representation.107 
However, as previously noted, all these statements have only 
private/contractual force, and they bind only unions, employers, and 
employer associations taking part in the agreement, lacking any effect on 
any third party falling outside the main “representation channel.” 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS:  IS THERE ANY SPACE FOR 
“EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT” IN SUCH A CONTEXT? 
Among the targets of the Monti Government, in matters of industrial 
relations, there was the idea to promote “worker participation, in line with 
E.U. principles and with the purpose of improving the competitiveness of 
Italian companies.”  In order to achieve this goal, Article 4 delegated the 
Government to “enact one or more Legislative Decrees aimed at favoring 
forms of employee involvement,” which could be optionally introduced by 
the plant-level agreements.108 
First of all, it has to be underlined that, in line with previous Act 
proposals, future Legislative Decrees were supposed to promote a variety of 
instruments related to worker financial and management involvement.109  
Subsequent debate on the adoption of the delegated Decrees was mainly 
focused only on the introduction of incentives to variable salary schemes.  
In fact, the discussions started in September 2012 had the clear purpose of 
 
l’ordinamento giuridico dello Stato [Union Representation in the Agreement Dated May 31, 2013 and in 
the Recent Ruling of Unconstitutionality], WP C.S.D.L.E. 193 (2013) (It.).  
 107. I.e., 5% average between:  (1) the percentage of members on the total unionized workforce; (2) 
the percentage of votes in the shop-floor representative elections. 
 108. Arts. 1 (f) & 4, ¶ 62, L. n. 92/2012 (It.).   
 109. D.L. n. 803/2008 (It.); D.L. n. 964/2008 (It.); D.L. n. 1307/2008 (It.); D.L. n. 1531/2008 (It.); 
see Roberta Caragnano, La partecipazione dei lavoratori:  prima analisi delle recenti proposte di legge, 
n. 86 (Working Paper, Ass’n Stud. Int’l & Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel., 2009), available at 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/879WP_09_86.pdf (It.).  A “wide, all-encompassing 
Menu,” according to Luigi Mariucci, E’ proprio un very bad text?  Note critiche sulla riforma Monti-
Fornero [Is It a Very Bad Text”?  Critical Notes on the Monti-Fornero Reform], 3 LD 433 (2012) (It.).  
According to Art. 4, ¶ 62 L. n. 92/2012 (It.), the forms of employee involvement to be “promoted” by a 
future Legislative Decree were the following:  (1) information and consultation duties in favor of 
employees or their representatives, according to European Directive 2002/14/EC; (2) development of 
control procedures on the enactment of joint plans or decisions; (3) introduction of joint committees 
aimed at controlling and participating in managing activities in matter of workplace safety, health, equal 
opportunities, forms of variable salary, forms of Social Welfare, other subjects of Corporate Social 
Responsibility; (4) workers’ control on management decisions, through the workers’ presence in 
Supervisory Bodies; (5) employees’ participation in company profits or in the firm’s capital, or worker 
involvement in the enactment of industrial plans; (6) appointment of employees’ representatives in the 
Supervisory Board of Italian two-tiered structured companies or in European companies (Societas 
Europaea ex EC Regulation n. 2157/2001), in both cases only in the hypothesis of companies employing 
more than 300 workers; (7) employees’ access to Shareholding Plans and Firm’s Capital (directly or 
through Foundations). 
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finding new solutions to the productivity deficit of Italian companies by 
means of monetary, tax-free incentives to workers’ performance in addition 
to tax deductions.  
The Social Parties and the Government concluded the text of the 
“Productivity Agreement,” which opened the adoption of Prime Minister’s 
Decree of January 1, 2013 that provided only limited tax deductions in 
favor of variable salary forms up to maximum €2,500 for each worker 
earning up to €40,000 per year.110  In conclusion, these “weak” incentives 
to variable salary forms may seem rather inconsistent with the idea of 
promoting “employee involvement” according to Article 1.  In fact, this 
solution appears different in scope and concerns any form of worker 
participation in Management. 
In this sense, a clear example of the lack of consistency of the new 
norms is given by the intention to support board-level employee 
participation into the Supervisory Boards of European Companies and two-
tier structured Italian companies with more than 300 employees.111  Indeed, 
this purpose has to deal with the presence of only one European Company 
with its main office in Italy.112  In addition, two-tier structured companies 
are not widespread in Italy, considering that their degree of diffusion is 
under 1% among Italian companies.113  The hypothesis of a collective 
agreement introducing any form of employee representation in the 
Supervisory Board of the latter company types seems to be very marginal. 
Ultimately, while the use of variable salary forms may acquire even 
more relevance in the future, albeit it would always depend on the financial 
consistency of the monetary incentives, serious doubts influence the 
chances of full implementation of any form of effective “worker 
involvement” in the Management of Italian companies, despite the explicit 
reference to such involvement as one of the main goals of the most recent 
reform.114  It may be concluded that the “cultural gap” between Italy and 
other European countries in matter of employee involvement, as noted more 
than ten years ago by the 2001 “White Paper,” has not yet been completely 
filled. 
 
 110. Productivity Agreement of Nov. 21, 2012 (It.); Marco Barbieri, Un accordo senza respiro [An 
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WP C.S.D.L.E. 185 (2013) (It.). 
 111. See Art. 4, ¶ 62(f) L. n. 92/2012 (It.).  
 112. Galleria del Brennero SE, which is far below the 300-employee threshold at the moment.  See 
http://www.bbt-se.com/en/company/personnel (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 113. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Laura Pellegrini & Emiliano Sironi, Why Do Italian Joint Stock 
Companies Adopt One or Two-Tier Board?, 118 RISS 3 (2010). 
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